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Abstract—Wireless information surveillance, by which sus-
picious wireless communications are closely monitored by le-
gitimate agencies, is an integral part of national security. To
enhance the information surveillance capability, we propose in
this paper a new proactive eavesdropping approach via a spoofing
relay, where the legitimate monitor operates in a full-duplex
manner with simultaneous eavesdropping and spoofing relaying
to vary the source transmission rate in favor of the eavesdropping
performance. To this end, a power splitting receiver is proposed,
where the signal received at each antenna of the legitimate
monitor is split into two parts for information eavesdropping
and spoofing relaying, respectively. We formulate an optimization
problem to maximize the achievable eavesdropping rate by jointly
optimizing the power splitting ratios and relay beamforming
matrix at the multi-antenna monitor. Depending on the suspicious
and eavesdropping channel conditions, the optimal solution
corresponds to three possible spoofing relay strategies, namely
constructive relaying, jamming, and simultaneous jamming and
destructive relaying. Numerical results show that the proposed
technique significantly improves the eavesdropping rate of the
legitimate monitor as compared to the existing passive eaves-
dropping and jamming-based eavesdropping schemes.
Index Terms—Wireless information surveillance, proactive
eavesdropping, spoofing relay, power splitting, beamforming,
jamming.
I. INTRODUCTION
The great success of wireless communication technology
has drastically improved our life during the past few decades.
By providing high-speed wireless connectivity essentially
anywhere, anytime, and between any pair of devices, con-
temporary wireless communication systems not only make
our daily life increasingly more convenient, but also provide
numerous new opportunities for applications and innovations
in almost all fields, such as education, business, industry,
etc. However, the ubiquitous accessibility of wireless com-
munication systems also makes them more vulnerable to be
misused by malicious users to commit crimes, jeopardize the
public safety, and invade the privacy of others, etc. Therefore,
it becomes increasingly important for the legitimate parties,
such as the government agencies, to implement effective
information surveillance measures to monitor any suspicious
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communication for various purposes such as intelligence
gathering, terrorism/crime prevention and investigation, etc.
From an engineering design perspective, devising efficient
schemes for wireless information surveillance calls for a
paradigm shift from that for conventional wireless security
[1], [2]. In wireless security, the eavesdroppers are treated as
adversaries, whose eavesdropping potential should be mini-
mized. Various wireless security mechanisms, both in physical
layer [3] and across upper layers of communication system
protocols design [4], have been proposed to prevent or mini-
mize the information leakage to the unintended eavesdroppers.
In particular, under the classic wiretap channel setup [5],
significant efforts have been devoted to characterizing the
secrecy capacity [6]–[8], defined as the maximum transmission
rate at which the message can be reliably decoded at the
legitimate receiver without leaking any useful information to
eavesdropping receivers. For wireless surveillance, however,
the monitor is regarded as a legitimate eavesdropper, whose
eavesdropping rate over any suspicious channel should be
maximized to effectively intercept the transmitted information
over the air.
One straightforward approach for wireless information
surveillance is passive eavesdropping, where the legitimate
monitor only listens to the wireless channels of any suspicious
users to decode their transmitted messages. However, this
approach is effective only when the eavesdropping channel
from the source to the legitimate monitor is better than the
suspicious channel to the destination, so that the information
sent by the suspicious source can be reliably decoded at the
legitimate monitor. Yet this does not hold in practice if the
legitimate monitor is located further away from the suspicious
source compared to the suspicious destination. To overcome
this limitation, a proactive eavesdropping scheme via cognitive
jamming technique is proposed in [1], [2], where the legitimate
monitor sends noise-like jamming signals to intentionally
degrade the suspicious link, so as to induce the suspicious
source to reduce transmission rate to be decodable at the
legitimate monitor receiver. However, given the limited power
budget for jamming, the eavesdropping performance cannot be
improved if the suspicious channel capacity is higher than that
of the eavesdropping channel even with the maximum-power
jamming. Furthermore, there are also scenarios when it is
desirable for the legitimate monitor to spoof the suspicious
source to increase its transmission rate to achieve higher
eavesdropping rate. In such cases, jamming is not effective
and more intelligent strategies need to be devised for proactive
eavesdropping.
To further enhance the information surveillance capability
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2Fig. 1: Wireless information surveillance via a multi-antenna
legitimate monitor.
of legitimate monitors, we propose in this paper a new proac-
tive eavesdropping approach via a so-called spoofing relay
technique. Specifically, besides information eavesdropping, the
legitimate monitor also acts concurrently as a relay to send
spoofing signals to the suspicious destination and thereby
induce the source to vary the transmission rate in favor of the
eavesdropping performance. The underlying assumption is that
adaptive rate transmission is adopted at the suspicious source
based on the effective channel condition at the destination.
Under this setup, if the eavesdropping link (from the source
to the legitimate monitor) is stronger than the suspicious link
(from the source to the destination), the legitimate monitor
will enhance the effective channel of the suspicious link
by forwarding a constructive source signal to the suspicious
destination, which leads to higher transmission rate by the
suspicious source, and thus higher eavesdropping rate. On
the other hand, if the eavesdropping link is weaker than
the suspicious link, the legitimate monitor will degrade the
effective channel of the suspicious link via forwarding a
destructive source signal and/or a noise-like jamming signal to
the suspicious destination, so as to spoof the suspicious source
to reduce its transmission rate to a level decodable by the
eavesdropping monitor. Note that the proposed spoofing relay
technique is quite general since it is applicable regardless of
whether the eavesdropping link is stronger or weaker than the
suspicious link. Furthermore, it includes the existing passive
and jamming-based eavesdropping [1], [2] as special cases,
and thus is expected to outperform these two benchmark
schemes. Intuitively, the proposed spoofing relay scheme
is strictly beneficial when either the eavesdropping link is
stronger than the suspicious link (so that constructive relaying
improves the eavesdropping rate), or when the eavesdropping
link is too weak such that jamming alone is insufficient (so
destructive relaying is needed), as will be verified later in this
paper by numerical results. The main contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows.
• First, we model the system architecture for wireless
information surveillance via a legitimate multi-antenna
monitor, as shown in Fig. 1. A power splitting receiver1
is proposed to split the received signal at each receiving
antenna of the legitimate monitor into two parts, one
1Notice that power splitting technique has also been used for separating
the received signal for information decoding and energy harvesting in
simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) systems [9],
[10].
for information eavesdropping and the other for spoofing
relaying. An optimization problem is then formulated
to maximize the eavesdropping rate by the legitimate
monitor via jointly optimizing the power splitting ratios
for all of its receiving antennas and the relay beamform-
ing/precoding matrix for the transmitting antennas.
• Next, we derive the optimal solution to the formulated
problem by first solving two key sub-problems, which
respectively find the maximum and minimum effective
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the suspicious link receiver
by optimizing the relay precoding matrix at the legitimate
monitor transmitter with fixed receiver power splitting
ratios. Based on the obtained solutions, we further show
that uniform power splitting, i.e., all receiving antennas
at the legitimate monitor use the same power splitting
ratio, is optimal for maximizing the eavesdropping rate
with spoofing relaying, which thus leads to an efficient
solution for the optimal power splitting ratios. Finally,
the problem is solved with three possible relay strategies
at the legitimate monitor, namely constructive relaying,
jamming, and simultaneous jamming and destructive
relaying, which are applied when the eavesdropping
channel is better, weaker, and severely weaker than the
suspicious channel, respectively.
• At last, numerical results are provided, which show that
the eavesdropping rate achievable by the proposed spoof-
ing relay scheme is significantly higher than that of the
two benchmark schemes, namely passive eavesdropping
and jamming-based proactive eavesdropping [1], [2].
It is worth pointing out that under the classic physical-
layer security framework, secure communication for wireless
relay channels has been studied in various setups. Depending
on the role of the relay node, such existing works can be
loosely classified into three categories: (i) trusted relay that
helps the source transmitter in improving the secrecy rate
in the presence of the eavesdropper, via cooperative signal
relaying to the destination or cooperative jamming to the
eavesdropper [11]–[13]; (ii) untrusted relay from which the
source transmitter wishes to keep the information confidential
while engaging its help [14], [15]; and (iii) adversary relay
that helps the eavesdropper, rather than the source transmit-
ter, in decreasing the secrecy rate [16], [17]. On the other
hand, proactive eavesdropping in different forms such as
pilot contamination attack, false feedback, etc., has also been
studied recently [18]–[26]. However, all the aforementioned
works focus on the conventional wireless security design
based on the information-theoretic secrecy capacity measure,
which treats the eavesdroppers as adversaries and thus aims
to minimize the information leakage to them. In contrast,
for the proactive eavesdropping considered in this paper, the
eavesdropper is employed by a legitimate monitor for the
different purpose of information surveillance, and how to
maximize its eavesdropping rate via optimally designing the
spoofing relay strategy is a new problem that has not been
studied in the literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the system model for proactive eavesdropping with
3a spoofing relay, and presents the problem formulation for
eavesdropping rate maximization. Section III presents the
optimal solution for the formulated problem, as well as a low-
cost implementation that only requires one power splitter at the
legitimate monitor receiver. In Section IV, numerical results
are presented to compare the proposed proactive eavesdrop-
ping scheme with the two benchmark schemes. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section V.
Notations: In this paper, scalars are denoted by italic letters.
Boldface lower- and upper-case letters denote vectors and
matrices, respectively. CM×N denotes the space of M × N
complex-valued matrices. I represents an identity matrix, 0
and 1 denote an all-zero and all-one matrix, respectively.
For a matrix A, its complex conjugate, transpose, Hermitian
transpose, and Frobenius norm are respectively denoted as
A∗, AT , AH , and ‖A‖F . For a vector a, ‖a‖ represents its
Euclidean norm. diag(a) denotes a diagonal matrix with the
diagonal elements given in the vector a. a  b means that each
element in a is no greater than that in b. For a complex number
z, ∠z represents its phase, and <(z) and =(z) denote its real
and imaginary parts, respectively. The symbol j represents the
imaginary unit of complex numbers, i.e., j2 = −1.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider an information surveillance
scenario, where the legitimate monitor E is intended to
overhear a suspicious communication link from source S
to destination D. We assume that both S and D have one
single antenna each, whereas E is equipped with M ≥ 1
receiving and N ≥ 1 transmitting antennas. We consider that
adaptive rate transmission is adopted at S based on the channel
perceived at D. However, neither S nor D is aware of the
presence of E, so that no dedicated coding as in conventional
physical-layer security (see e.g., [3] and references therein)
is applied to prevent the eavesdropping by E. On the other
hand, the legitimate monitor E can conduct either passive or
proactive eavesdropping, as discussed below.
A. Passive Eavesdropping
With passive eavesdropping, E remains silent throughout
the communication between S and D, but tries to decode the
information from S. In this case, the channel capacity of the
suspicious link from S to D, which is also assumed to be the
transmission rate by S, is given by2
RD = log2
(
1 +
PS |hSD|2
σ2
)
, (1)
where hSD is the complex-valued channel gain from S to D,
PS is the transmit power by S, and σ2 is the power of the
additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at D. On the other
hand, the capacity of the single-input multiple-output (SIMO)
2The results in this paper can be readily extended to the practical scenario
with non-Gaussian signaling [27], by e.g., inserting a gap Γ in the capacity
formula (1) as RD = log2
(
1 +
PS |hSD|2
Γσ2
)
, where Γ > 1 accounts for the
capacity loss due to practical modulation and coding in use.
Fig. 2: The architecture of a multi-antenna eavesdropper with
spoofing relay.
eavesdropping channel from S to E is
RE = log2
(
1 +
PS‖hSE‖2
σ2
)
, (2)
where hSE ∈ CM×1 denotes the SIMO channel from S to
the M receiving antennas of E. If RE ≥ RD or equivalently
‖hSE‖2 ≥ |hSD|2, i.e., the legitimate monitor has a better
channel than the suspicious destination, E can reliably decode
the information sent by S with arbitrarily small error proba-
bility. As a result, the effective eavesdropping rate is given by
Rev = RD. On the other hand, if RE < RD, or the legitimate
monitor has a weaker channel than the suspicious destination,
then it is impossible for E to decode the information from
S without any error. In this case, we define the effective
eavesdropping rate as Rev = 0.3 Therefore, the effective
eavesdropping rate can be expressed as
Rev =
{
RD, if RE ≥ RD
0, otherwise.
(3)
B. Proactive Eavesdropping via Spoofing Relay
In this subsection, we propose a proactive scheme for
the legitimate monitor via the spoofing relay technique to
enhance the eavesdropping rate over passive eavesdropping.
To enable continuous information surveillance with concurrent
proactive spoofing relaying, we assume that E operates in a
full-duplex mode with simultaneous information reception and
spoofing signal transmission. As will become clear later, one
key requirement for the spoofing relay technique is that the
excessive time delay of the two effective signal paths (i.e.,
the direct link from the source to destination and that via the
spoofing relay) is much smaller than the symbol duration to
avoid causing inter-symbol interference (ISI). Therefore, we
assume that the amplify-and-forward (AF) relaying strategy is
3Note that in this case E may still extract useful information from
its received signal. However, in this paper we consider a more stringent
requirement that the message from S needs to be decoded at E with arbitrarily
small error probability to achieve the wireless surveillance goal.
4adopted by E since it usually has smaller processing delay than
other relay processing technique such as decode-and-forward
(DF). Therefore, the received signal yE ∈ CM×1 by the M
receiving antennas of E can be expressed as
yE = hSE
√
PSdS + HEExE + n
(A)
E , (4)
where dS ∼ CN (0, 1) denotes the circularly-symmetric com-
plex Gaussian (CSCG) distributed information-bearing symbol
sent by S with transmit power PS , HEE ∈ CM×N represents
the loop channel from the N transmitting antennas of E to
its own M receiving antennas, xE ∈ CN×1 denotes the
transmitted signal by E, and n(A)E ∈ CM×1 represents the
antenna noise received by E. Note that the second term in the
expression of yE in (4) is due to the full-duplex operation
at E, which in general couples the input and output signals
of E. To avoid circuit oscillations in practice as well as to
suppress the self-interference from the loop channel, the input
and output of E must be sufficiently isolated [28]. For ease
of exposition, we assume that the ideal input-output isolation
is achieved at E by designing xE that completely nulls the
output of the loop-channel, i.e.,
HEExE = 0. (5)
Thus, the received signal by E in (4) reduces to yE =
hSE
√
PSdS+n
(A)
E . As shown in Fig. 2, to achieve simultane-
ous spoofing relaying and information eavesdropping at E un-
der the AF operation, the received signal yE,m at each antenna
m of E is split into two parts, one for constructive/destructive
information relaying aiming to enhance/degrade the effective
channel of the suspicious link from S to D, and the other
for information decoding so as to eavesdrop the message sent
by S. Denote by 0 ≤ ρm ≤ 1 the power splitting ratio of
antenna m, the signal vector split for information relaying can
be expressed as
y′E = diag(
√
ρ)yE = diag(
√
ρ)
(
hSE
√
PSdS + n
(A)
E
)
,
(6)
where ρ = [ρ1, · · · , ρM ]T represents the power splitting
vector, and
√
ρ represents a vector obtained by taking element-
wise square root. The transmitted signal xE ∈ CN×1 by the
N transmitting antennas of E can then be expressed as
xE = Wˆ
(
y′E + n
(R)
E
)
(7)
≈ Wˆ
(
diag(
√
ρ)hSE
√
PSdS + n
(R)
E
)
, (8)
where Wˆ ∈ CN×M is the relay precoding matrix at E, and
n
(R)
E ∼ CN (0, σ2IM ) denotes the processing noise introduced
during the relaying operation at E, which is assumed to
dominate over the antenna noise n(A)E ; thus, n
(A)
E is ignored
in (8). The transmit power by E is thus given by
E
[‖xE‖2] = PS‖Wˆdiag(√ρ)hSE‖2 + σ2‖Wˆ‖2F . (9)
By assuming that the processing delay due to the AF relaying
at E is much smaller than the symbol duration, and hence is
negligible, the signal received at D can be expressed as
yD =hSD
√
PSdS + h
H
EDxE + nD (10)
=
(
hSD + h
H
EDWˆdiag(
√
ρ)hSE
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
h˜SD
√
PSdS
+ hHEDWˆn
(R)
E + nD︸ ︷︷ ︸
n˜D
, (11)
where hHED ∈ C1×N denotes the multiple-input single-output
(MISO) channel from the N transmitting antennas of E to D,
and nD ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the AWGN at D. It is observed from
(11) that by adjusting the power splitting ratio vector ρ and
the precoding matrix Wˆ, the legitimate monitor E is able to
alter the effective channel h˜SD of the suspicious link from
S to D. The capacity of the suspicious link is thus given by
R˜D = log2(1 + γ˜D), where γ˜D is the effective SNR at D,
which can be obtained from (11) as a function of ρ and Wˆ
as
γ˜D(ρ,Wˆ) =
∣∣∣hSD + hHEDWˆdiag(√ρ)hSE∣∣∣2 P˜S
1 + ‖hHEDWˆ‖2
, (12)
where P˜S , PS/σ2 represents the transmit SNR by S. Note
that the term ‖hHEDWˆ‖2 in the denominator of (12) is due to
the noise amplification by E.
On the other hand, at the information decoder of E, the split
signal based on which the message from S is decoded can be
expressed as
y˜E = diag(
√
1− ρ)hSE
√
PSdS + n
(D)
E , (13)
where n(D)E ∼ CN (0, σ2IM ) denotes the AWGN at the infor-
mation decoder of E. Thus, the information rate achievable by
E with the optimal maximal ratio combining (MRC) over all
the M signal branches is R˜E = log2(1 + γ˜E), where γ˜E is
the SNR as a function of ρ given by
γ˜E(ρ) =h
H
SEdiag(1− ρ)hSEP˜S
=
(‖hSE‖2 − hHSEdiag(ρ)hSE) P˜S . (14)
To study the fundamental performance limit achievable by
the legitimate monitor, we assume that perfect channel state
information (CSI) of all links is available at E. Note that in
practice, the loop channel HEE can be estimated beforehand
at the legitimate monitor. On the other hand, the channels
hSE and hED could be estimated at the legitimate monitor
by overhearing the pilot signals sent by S and D, respectively.
For the suspicious link channel hSD, it could be obtained by
overhearing the channel feedback sent from D to S.
C. Problem Formulation
The objective of the legitimate monitor E is to jointly opti-
mize the power splitting ratio vector ρ and the relay precoding
matrix Wˆ so that the eavesdropping rate is maximized. Based
5on the definition in (3), the problem can be formulated as
(P1) :

max
Wˆ,ρ
R˜D(ρ,Wˆ)
s.t. R˜E(ρ) ≥ R˜D(ρ,Wˆ)
HEEWˆ = 0,
0  ρ  1,
P˜S‖Wˆdiag(√ρ)hSE‖2 + ‖Wˆ‖2F ≤ P˜E ,
(15)
where the zero-forcing (ZF) constraint HEEWˆ = 0 follows
from (5) and (7), and P˜E represents the maximum power
available at E normalized by the noise power σ2. (P1) is a
non-convex optimization problem. However, by exploiting its
structure, the optimal solution can be efficiently obtained, as
shown next.
III. OPTIMAL SOLUTION
To obtain the optimal solution to (P1), we first consider the
ZF constraint HEEWˆ = 0. This implies that the precoding
matrix Wˆ must lie in the null space of HEE . Let the (reduced)
singular value decomposition (SVD) of HEE be expressed as
HEE = U1Λ1V
H
1 , where U1 ∈ CM×r1 and V1 ∈ CN×r1
contain the r1 orthonormal left and right singular vectors
of HEE , respectively, with r1 ≤ min{M,N} denoting the
matrix rank of HEE , and Λ1 = diag(λ1, · · · , λr1) contains
the r1 positive singular values of HEE . Further denote by
V0 ∈ CN×r0 with r0 , N − r1 the orthogonal complement
of V1, i.e., the concatenated matrix V , [V1 V0] forms an
orthonormal basis for the N -dimensional space with VHV =
IN . The precoding matrix Wˆ satisfying the ZF constraint in
(P1) can then be expressed as
Wˆ = V0W, (16)
where W ∈ Cr0×M denotes the new matrix to be designed.
It is not difficult to observe that in order for the ZF constraint
to be feasible, we must have r0 ≥ 1, or equivalently the rank
of HEE must satisfy r1 < N . Since r1 ≤ min{M,N}, one
sufficient (but not necessary) condition is thus N > M , i.e.,
more antennas at E should be allocated for transmission than
that for reception.
By substituting (16) into (12), the effective SNR at D as a
function of ρ and W can be expressed as
γ˜D(ρ,W) =
∣∣∣hSD + hˆHEDWdiag(√ρ)hSE∣∣∣2 P˜S
1 + ‖hˆHEDW‖2
, (17)
where hˆED , VH0 hED denotes the projected channel of
hED onto the null space of HEE . Furthermore, since the link
capacity R˜D and R˜E monotonically increase with the SNR
γ˜D(ρ,W) and γ˜E(ρ), respectively, (P1) thus reduces to
(P2) :

max
W,ρ
γ˜D(ρ,W)
s.t. γ˜E(ρ) ≥ γ˜D(ρ,W)
0  ρ  1,
P˜S‖Wdiag(√ρ)hSE‖2 + ‖W‖2F ≤ P˜E ,
(18)
where the last constraint follows from the equality ‖Wˆa‖2 =
‖Wa‖2, ∀a ∈ CM×1, and ‖Wˆ‖2F = ‖W‖2F due to the
fact that VH0 V0 = I. Note that (P2) is equivalent to
(P1) in the sense that they have the same optimal value
(except the logarithmic transformation between rate and SNR),
and their optimal solutions are related by the simple linear
transformation equation (16). (P2) is still a non-convex opti-
mization problem, due to the non-concave objective function
as well as the non-convexity of the first constraint. However,
by exploiting the special structure of the SNR expressions
for γ˜E(ρ) and γ˜D(ρ,W), the optimal solution to (P2) can
be efficiently obtained. Specifically, by firstly optimizing the
precoding matrix W with fixed power splitting vector ρ, the
maximum and minimum achievable SNRs (or equivalently the
achievable SNR range) at D with fixed ρ can be obtained.
The problem (P2) then reduces to finding the optimal power
splitting vector ρ, as formulated in (P3) in Section III-C. The
details are given next.
A. Maximum Achievable SNR at D with Fixed ρ
To obtain the optimal solution to (P2), it is noted that the
SNR γ˜E(ρ) at E only depends on the power splitting ratio
vector ρ, rather than the precoding matrix W. Thus, for any
fixed ρ, we first obtain the maximum achievable SNR at D,
denoted as γ˜maxD (ρ), by optimizing W as
γ˜maxD (ρ) ,
{
max
W
γ˜D(ρ,W)
s.t. P˜S‖WhˆSE‖2 + ‖W‖2F ≤ P˜E ,
(19)
where we have defined hˆSE , diag(
√
ρ)hSE .
Theorem 1. The optimal solution to problem (19) is
W?1 =
√
µ?1e
j∠hSD h˜EDh˜HSE , (20)
where h˜ED , hˆED/‖hˆED‖, h˜SE , hˆSE/‖hˆSE‖, and
µ?1 = min
{
‖hˆSE‖2
|hSD|2‖hˆED‖2 ,
P˜E
P˜S‖hˆSE‖2+1
}
. Furthermore, the
corresponding optimal value is given by (21) shown at the
top of the next page.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Theorem 1 shows that in order to maximize the SNR at
D, the precoding matrix W at E should be chosen such
that the two signal paths from S to D, namely the direct
link and that via the monitor relaying, add constructively,
i.e., ∠hSD = ∠hˆHEDWhˆSE . We term such a strategy of the
spoofing relay as constructive information forwarding, since
it helps enhance the effective channel of the suspicious link
from S to D. Furthermore, (20) shows that the optimal relay
precoding matrix W?1 is given by a rank-1 matrix, with a
simple MRC-based linear combining (by the term h˜HSE) of
the output of the power splitters cascaded by a maximal-ratio
transmission (MRT) beamforming (by the term h˜ED) [27].
It is also noted from (21) that for any fixed power splitting
ratios ρ, the maximum achievable SNR γ˜maxD (ρ) at D depends
on ρ only via the term ‖hˆSE‖2 = hHSEdiag(ρ)hSE . In
particular, if ρ = 0, i.e., no information forwarding is applied
at E, we have γ˜maxD (0) = P˜S |hSD|2, which corresponds to
the special case of passive eavesdropping previously discussed
6γ˜maxD (ρ) =

(
1 + ‖hˆSE‖
2
|hSD|2
)
P˜S |hSD|2, if ‖hˆSE‖
2
|hSD|2‖hˆED‖2 ≤
P˜E
P˜S‖hˆSE‖2+1(√
P˜S‖hˆSE‖2+1+
√
P˜E‖hˆSE‖2‖hˆED‖2/|hSD|2
)2
P˜S |hSD|2
P˜S‖hˆSE‖2+P˜E‖hˆED‖2+1 , otherwise.
(21)
in Section II-A. On the other hand, if ρ = 1 and PE is
sufficiently large, we have γ˜maxD (1) = P˜S(|hSD|2 +‖hSE‖2).
This results in the maximum SNR achievable at D which is
equivalent to that achieved by MRC-based signal detection
jointly performed at E and D. However, in this case, there
is no signal split for information decoding at the legitimate
monitor and thus the effective eavesdropping rate will be zero.
B. Minimum Achievable SNR at D with Fixed ρ
Next, for fixed power splitting ratios ρ, we study the min-
imum achievable SNR at D, denoted as γ˜minD (ρ), which can
be obtained by solving the following optimization problem,
γ˜minD (ρ) ,
{
min
W
γ˜D(ρ,W)
s.t. P˜S‖WhˆSE‖2 + ‖W‖2F ≤ P˜E .
(22)
Theorem 2. The optimal solution to problem (22) is
W?2 = −ej∠hSD h˜ED
(√
z?1 h˜SE +
√
z?2 h˜
⊥
SE
)H
, (23)
where h˜⊥SE is any unit-norm vector that is orthogonal to h˜SE ,
i.e., h˜HSEh˜
⊥
SE = 0, and z
?
1 and z
?
2 are the optimal solution to
the following problem,
γ˜minD (ρ) ,

min
z1,z2
γ˜′′D(z1, z2) ,
(|hSD|−√z1‖hˆED‖‖hˆSE‖)2P˜S
1+‖hˆED‖2(z1+z2)
s.t.
(
1 + P˜S‖hˆSE‖2
)
z1 + z2 ≤ P˜E ,
z1, z2 ≥ 0.
(24)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
Theorem 2 shows that in order to minimize the SNR at D,
the precoding matrix W by E should be chosen such that
the two effective signal paths from S to D add destructively,
i.e., ∠hSD = pi + ∠hˆHEDWhˆSE . Such a strategy at E is
termed as destructive information forwarding, which degrades
the effective channel of the suspicious link from S to D.
Furthermore, similar to W?1 for maximizing SNR at D, W?2
in (23) for SNR minimization at D is also a rank-one matrix
with a similar structure. However, although the MRT-based
transmit beamforming still applies, the preceding combining
vector for the power-splitting output is in general given by
a linear combination of the MRC combining h˜SE and its
orthogonal vector h˜⊥SE . Note that although the power allocated
along the direction h˜⊥SE does not forward any destructive
source signal to D, it also contributes to the SNR degradation
at D via jamming, i.e., amplifying the noise at E to D. Thus,
the optimal relaying strategy by E for SNR minimization at
D in general involves both destructive information forwarding
and jamming.
Theorem 3. The optimal solution and the corresponding
optimal value of problem (24) are respectively given by (25)
and (26) shown at the top of the next page, where
Z1 ,
(
1 + P˜E‖hˆED‖2
)2
P˜ 2S |hSD|2‖hˆED‖2‖hˆSE‖2
,
Z2 , P˜E − (1 + P˜S‖hˆSE‖2)Z1, (27)
C1 , P˜S
(
P˜SP˜E |hSD|2‖hˆED‖2 −
(
1 + P˜E‖hˆED‖2
)2)
.
(28)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
The results in (25) and (26) show that if both P˜E and the
split power ‖hˆSE‖2 for information relaying are sufficiently
large (corresponding to the first case in (25) and (26)), the
destructive relaying signal from E is able to completely cancel
the signal of the direct path from S at D, and thus makes the
SNR at D equal to zero. In this case, no dedicated jamming
is needed (z?2 = 0) for SNR minimization at D. On the other
hand, if destructive information relaying is unable to drive
the SNR at D to zero with the given transmit power of E,
both destructive relaying and jamming are in general needed
for the SNR degradation at D. Furthermore, similar to that in
(21), the minimum achievable SNR γ˜minD (ρ) in (26) depends
on ρ only via the term ‖hˆSE‖2. In particular, if ρ = 0, i.e., no
information forwarding is applied at E, we have γ˜minD (0) =
P˜S |hSD|2/(1 + P˜E‖hˆED‖2), which corresponds to jamming
(merely noise amplification) with full power of E.
C. Optimal Solution to (P2)
Now we obtain the optimal solution to problem (P2) based
on the above results. Since γ˜D(ρ,W) given in (17) is a
continuous function of W, for any fixed power splitting ratio
vector 0  ρ  1, the set of achievable SNRs at D is given by
the interval
[
γ˜minD (ρ), γ˜
max
D (ρ)
]
, with γ˜maxD (ρ) and γ˜
min
D (ρ)
denoting the maximum and minimum achievable SNRs given
in closed-forms by (21) and (26), respectively. As a result,
(P2) reduces to finding the optimal power splitting ratios ρ
via solving the following optimization problem,
(P3) :

max
ρ,γ˜D
γ˜D
s.t. γ˜minD (ρ) ≤ γ˜D ≤ γ˜maxD (ρ)
γ˜D ≤ γ˜E(ρ)
0  ρ  1.
(29)
Theorem 4. Without loss of optimality to (P3), the power
splitting ratio vector ρ can be expressed as ρ = ρ1 for 0 ≤
ρ ≤ 1.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D.
Theorem 4 shows that uniform power splitting (UPS),
i.e., all the M receiving antennas at E employ the same
7(z?1 , z
?
2) =

(
|hSD|2
‖hˆED‖2‖hˆSE‖2 , 0
)
, if P˜E‖hˆED‖2 > P˜S |hSD|2 and ‖hˆSE‖2 ≥ |hSD|
2
P˜E‖hˆED‖2−P˜S |hSD|2 ,
(Z1, Z2) , if P˜E‖hˆED‖2 ≤ P˜S |hSD|2 and ‖hˆSE‖2C1 >
(
1 + P˜E‖hˆED‖2
)2(
P˜E
1+P˜S‖hˆSE‖2 , 0
)
, otherwise,
(25)
γ˜minD (ρ) =

0, if P˜E‖hˆED‖2 > P˜S |hSD|2 and ‖hˆSE‖2 ≥ |hSD|
2
P˜E‖hˆED‖2−P˜S |hSD|2 ,
P˜S |hSD|2
1+P˜E‖hˆED‖2 − 1, if P˜E‖hˆED‖
2 ≤ P˜S |hSD|2 and ‖hˆSE‖2C1 >
(
1 + P˜E‖hˆED‖2
)2
(√
1+P˜S‖hˆSE‖2− ‖hˆED‖‖hˆSE‖|hSD|
√
P˜E
)2
P˜S |hSD|2
1+P˜S‖hˆSE‖2+P˜E‖hˆED‖2 , otherwise.
(26)
power splitting ratio, is optimal to (P3). By substituting with
ρ = ρ1 and after some simple manipulations, γ˜E(ρ) in (14)
and γ˜maxD (ρ) in (21) respectively reduce to the uni-variate
functions
γ˜E(ρ) = (1− ρ)‖hSE‖2P˜S , (30)
γ˜maxD (ρ) =

(
1 + ρ‖hSE‖
2
|hSD|2
)
P˜S |hSD|2, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ ρ1(√
1+ρ‖hSE‖2P˜S+ ‖hSE‖‖hˆED‖|hSD|
√
ρP˜E
)2
P˜S |hSD|2
1+ρ‖hSE‖2P˜S+‖hˆED‖2P˜E ,
ρ1 < ρ ≤ 1,
(31)
where ρ1 , min
{
1,
−1+
√
1+4P˜SP˜E |hSD|2‖hˆED‖2
2‖hSE‖2P˜S
}
. Further-
more, γ˜minD (ρ) in (26) reduces to the uni-variate function
(32) shown at the top of the next page, where ρ2 ,
min
{
1, |hSD|
2
‖hSE‖2(P˜E‖hˆED‖2−P˜S |hSD|2)
}
, and ρ3 = C2 if
0 ≤ C2 ≤ 1, and ρ3 = 1 otherwise, with C2 ,
(1+P˜E‖hˆED‖2)2
‖hSE‖2P˜S
(
P˜SP˜E |hSD|2‖hˆED‖2−(1+P˜E‖hˆED‖2)2
) .
As a result, (P3) reduces to finding the optimal single power
splitting ratio ρ via solving
(P3′) :

max
0≤ρ≤1,γ˜D
γ˜D
s.t. γ˜minD (ρ) ≤ γ˜D ≤ γ˜maxD (ρ)
γ˜D ≤ γ˜E(ρ).
(33)
By noticing that γ˜E(ρ) in (30) is a linear decreasing function
of ρ, (P3′) is essentially equivalent to finding the “best”
intersection point between the line γ˜E(ρ) and the set
X , {(γ, ρ)|0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, γ˜minD (ρ) ≤ γ ≤ γ˜maxD (ρ)} (34)
in the γ-ρ plane, which can be optimally solved by separately
considering the following three cases, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
Case 1: γ˜maxD (0) < γ˜E(0) or |hSD|2 < ‖hSE‖2 as
illustrated in Fig. 3(a). In this case, the legitimate monitor E
has a better channel than the suspicious receiver D. Intuitively,
E should perform constructive information forwarding to
enhance the effective channel of D so as to increase the
eavesdropping rate. It follows from Fig. 3(a) that the optimal
solution to (P2) is given by the intersection point of the
two curves γ˜maxD (ρ) and γ˜E(ρ). As γ˜
max
D (ρ) and γ˜E(ρ)
are monotonically increasing and decreasing functions over
0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, respectively, and γ˜maxD (1) > γ˜E(1) = 0, the
equation γ˜maxD (ρ) = γ˜E(ρ) has one unique solution ρ
?, which
can be efficiently obtained via bisection method.
Furthermore, if E has sufficiently large power P˜E , ρ? can
be obtained in closed-form, as given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If α , ‖hSE‖
2
|hSD|2 > 1 and P˜E ≥
α(1+‖hSE‖2P˜S)
‖hˆED‖2 , the
optimal solution to (P3′) is ρ? = 12
(
1− 1α
)
, and the SNRs of
both D and E are γ˜?D = γ˜?E =
‖hSE‖2+|hSD|2
2 P˜S .
Proof: Lemma 1 directly follows by noticing that with
sufficiently large P˜E as specified in the lemma, γ˜maxD (ρ) in
(31) reduces to the linear function of ρ since ρ1 = 1.
Lemma 1 shows that by employing constructive relaying
with the optimal power splitting ratio ρ?, E is able to increase
the eavesdropping rate as compared to passive eavesdropping
since γ˜?D > |hSD|2P˜S . Furthermore, as α increases, more
power should be split at E for constructive relaying to
enhance the suspicious link SNR. In the extreme case when
α → ∞, i.e., the eavesdropper’s link is much stronger than
the suspicious user’s link, half of the power of the received
signal at E should be split for information relaying, and the
other half for information decoding (eavesdropping).
Case 2: γ˜minD (0) ≤ γ˜E(0) ≤ γ˜maxD (0) or |hSD|
2
1+‖hˆED‖2P˜E ≤
‖hSE‖2 ≤ |hSD|2, as illustrated in Fig. 3(b). In this case,
the eavesdropping link is worse than the suspicious link, but
it becomes better if jamming with full power is applied at
E to degrade the suspicious link. It follows from Fig. 3(b)
that the optimal solution to (P3′) is ρ? = 0, i.e., no
information forwarding and only jamming should be applied
at E, where the normalized jamming power is given by
P˜ ?E =
1
‖hˆED‖2
(
|hSD|2
‖hSE‖2 − 1
)
so as to degrade the suspicious
link SNR to the same level as that at E. In this case, the SNR
at both D and E is γ?D = γ?E = ‖hSE‖2P˜S .
Case 3: γ˜E(0) < γ˜minD (0) or ‖hSE‖2 < |hSD|
2
1+‖hˆED‖2P˜E , as
illustrated in Fig. 3(c). In this case, the legitimate monitor’s
link is worse than the suspicious user’s link even after jamming
with full power by E. Therefore, destructive information
forwarding and jamming should be both applied at E to further
degrade the suspicious link SNR. It follows from Fig. 3(c)
that the optimal solution ρ? to (P3′) is obtained by solving
γ˜minD (ρ) = γ˜E(ρ) in the interval 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, which can be
reduced to a quartic equation and hence solved efficiently.
Note that if more than one solutions exist, the one with the
smallest magnitude is the optimal solution. On the other hand,
8γ˜minD (ρ) =

0, ρ2 < ρ ≤ 1 for P˜E‖hˆED‖2 > P˜S |hSD|2
P˜S |hSD|2
1+P˜E‖hˆED‖2 − 1, ρ3 < ρ ≤ 1 for P˜E‖hˆED‖
2 ≤ P˜S |hSD|2(√
1+ρ‖hSE‖2P˜S− ‖hSE‖‖hˆED‖|hSD|
√
ρP˜E
)2
P˜S |hSD|2
1+ρ‖hSE‖2P˜S+‖hˆED‖2P˜E , otherwise,
(32)
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(c) Case 3: ‖hSE‖2 < |hSD|
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1+‖hˆED‖2P˜E
Fig. 3: Three cases for the optimal power splitting solution.
if no solution exists, it implies that problem (P3′), and hence
(P1), is infeasible, i.e., the legitimate monitor is unable to
degrade the suspicious user transmission rate to be decodable
by E with its given transmit power.
D. Low-Cost Implementation with One Single Power Splitter
The solution obtained in the preceding subsection in general
leads to positive power splitting ratios at all receiving antennas
of E (except for Case 2 where jamming only is optimal),
i.e., ρm > 0, ∀m; thus, in total M power splitters need
to be equipped at E, which could be costly in practice. In
this subsection, we show that for practical implementation,
one single power splitter is sufficient to achieve optimal
eavesdropping, regardless of the number of receiving antennas
M .
Theorem 5. There exists an optimal solution to (P3) such
that the power splitting ratios {ρm}Mm=1 are given by
ρm =
{
ρ, m = m?
0 or 1, m 6= m?. (35)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E.
Note that Appendix E gives a constructive proof of Theo-
rem 5, where the optimal power splitting ratio vector satisfying
(35) is obtained in closed-form (56) based on the optimal
uniform power splitting vector to problem (P3). Therefore, in
terms of computational complexity, the (semi-)binary power
splitting solution in Theorem 5 is comparable to that of the
uniform power splitting solution obtained in the preceding
subsection, which are both quite efficient since they only
require solving either a bisection search problem (for Case
1) or a quartic equation (for Case 3). However, in terms of
practical implementation, the solution given in Theorem 5 is
more cost-effective since it requires only one power splitter
Fig. 4: Eavesdropping rate versus α , ‖hSE‖2/|hSD|2, where
γ0 , PS |hSD|2/σ2 = 10 dB and PE = PS .
to be equipped at E, instead of M as for the uniform power
splitting scheme.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are provided to evaluate
the performance of the proposed proactive eavesdropping via
spoofing relay technique. We assume that the suspicious
source S and the suspicious destination D are separated by a
fixed distance dSD = 1000 meters (m). The legitimate monitor
E is located on the same line connecting S to D, with the
distance between S and E denoted as dSE that varies between
100m and 3000m for different eavesdropper locations. Such a
setup could correspond to the macro-cell users (with typical
cell radius on the order of km). Thus, the distance between E
and D can be expressed as dED = |dSD − dSE |. We assume
9that uniform linear arrays with adjacent elements separated by
half-wavelength are equipped at the transmitter and receiver
of E. Furthermore, we assume that all links are dominated
by the line-of-sight (LoS) channels that follow the free-space
path loss model. Unless otherwise specified, the number of
transmitting and receiving antennas at E are N = 2 and
M = 1, respectively. The operating frequency is assumed to
be 1.8 GHz. We define α , ‖hSE‖2/|hSD|2 as the channel
power ratio between the eavesdropping and the suspicious
links, where all the channels including hSE and hSD are
generated based on the eavesdropper’s location and the LoS
path loss model. Furthermore, denote γ0 , PS |hSD|2/σ2
as the reference SNR received at D with source transmis-
sion power PS and receiver noise power σ2. We consider
two benchmark schemes, namely passive eavesdropping as
discussed in Section II-A, and proactive eavesdropping with
jamming only [1], [2]. Note that with the definition given
in (3), passive eavesdropping has positive eavesdropping rate
only when E has better channel than D from the suspicious
source S, i.e., α ≥ 1. On the other hand, jamming is helpful
for enhancing the eavesdropping rate only when E has weaker
channel than D, i.e., α < 1.
First, we study the effect of α on the maximum eaves-
dropping rate achievable by the legitimate monitor with the
three eavesdropping schemes. To this end, we assume that the
legitimate monitor E moves towards S from the location with
dSE = 3000m to that with dSE = 100m. Correspondingly,
the channel power ratio α increases from around −10dB to
20dB. The transmission power PS by S is fixed to a value
such that the reference SNR γ0 = 10 dB, and the maximum
transmission power at E is set as PE = PS . The eavesdropping
rates Rev versus α with the three schemes are compared
in Fig. 4. It is observed that when E has a better channel
than D, i.e., α > 1 (0 dB), both passive eavesdropping and
jamming-based eavesdropping (with zero jamming power in
this case) achieve a constant Rev, which is equal to the channel
capacity of the suspicious link from S to D. In contrast,
the proposed proactive eavesdropping scheme with spoofing
relaying achieves a significantly higher eavesdropping rate,
since it is able to spoof the suspicious source S to increase
its transmission rate by constructively forwarding the source
signal to D, which is not possible in the two benchmark
schemes. When E has a worse channel than D, i.e., α < 1 (0
dB), the eavesdropping rate with the passive scheme drops to
zero, since E cannot reliably decode the information sent from
S. In contrast, as long as α is not too small, the two proactive
schemes can achieve strictly positive eavesdropping rate, since
they both jam the suspicious link to spoof the source S to
decrease its transmission rate to be decodable at E. Note that in
this regime, the proposed spoofing relay technique degenerates
to jamming (Case 2 as described in Section III-C), thus the
two proactive schemes obtain identical rate performance. As α
further decreases, e.g., α = −10 dB, E is unable to decode the
information sent by S even with the two proactive schemes,
and thus the eavesdropping rate drops to zero. However, it is
worth noting that at around α = −9dB, the proposed spoofing
relay technique still achieves strictly positive eavesdropping
rate, whereas that with jamming only is zero. This corresponds
Fig. 5: Eavesdropping rate versus the legitimate monitor’s power
budget PE , where γ0 = 10 dB.
to Case 3 as described in Section III-C, where both jamming
and destructive information forwarding can be jointly applied
to further degrade the suspicious link SNR for E to decode
the information sent by S.
Next, we investigate the effect of the legitimate monitor’s
power budget PE on the maximum achievable eavesdropping
rate with the three considered schemes. We compare two
setups with dSE = 400m and dSE = 2800m, respectively.
The transmission power PS by S is fixed such that γ0 = 10
dB, whereas the power budget PE at the legitimate monitor
varies such that the power ratio PE/PS increases from −15
dB to 10 dB. Fig. 5 shows the maximum eavesdropping rate
versus PE/PS by the three eavesdropping schemes under
the two setups. It is first observed that the eavesdropping
rate by the passive scheme is independent of PE , since no
transmission is performed at E. Furthermore, for the case
with dSE = 400m, the eavesdropping rate by the jamming
scheme is also independent of PE , since no jamming is needed
when the eavesdropping link is stronger than the suspicious
link. In contrast, the eavesdropping rate with the proposed
spoofing relay technique under dSE = 400m firstly increases
with PE , and then approaches to a constant value as PE gets
sufficiently large, which is in accordance with Lemma 1. For
the case of dSE = 2800m where E has worse channel than
D, both the two proactive schemes have zero eavesdropping
rate when PE is sufficiently small, whereas the rate increases
to a positive value when PE exceeds certain thresholds. It
is noted that if the eavesdropping link is stronger than the
suspicious link (e.g., dSE = 400m), then the proposed scheme
always outperforms the jamming-based scheme, regardless of
the power budget PE at the relay. On the other hand, for
dSE = 2800m so that the eavesdropping link is weaker than
the suspicious link, an excessive relay power about 2 dB is
required by jamming than the proposed scheme in order to
achieve the same eavesdropping rate of around 1.2 bps/Hz.
For the proposed spoofing relaying scheme, Fig. 6 plots
the optimal power splitting ratio ρ? at E versus PE/PS . It
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Fig. 6: Optimal power splitting ratio for the proposed spoofing
relaying versus PE , where γ0 = 10 dB.
is observed that for the case of dSE = 400m, ρ? firstly
decreases with PE , since larger transmission power at E
requires less signal power to be split for information relaying,
and hence more power can be split for eavesdropping. As PE
gets sufficiently large, ρ? approaches to a constant value of
0.42, which is in accordance with that predicted by Lemma 1.
On the other hand, for the case of dSE = 2800m, problem (P1)
is infeasible when PE is too small, which is indicated by the
infeasible ρ = −0.1 in Fig. 6. For PE/PS between −2dB and
0dB, a small fraction of the signal power received at E is split
for destructive information forwarding. As PE/PS increases
to 0 dB, ρ? becomes zero since jamming alone is optimal in
this case, which is consistent with the results in Fig. 5.
Next, we investigate the effect of source transmission power
PS on the eavesdropping rate. Similar to that in Fig. 5 and
Fig. 6, we consider two setups with dSE = 400m and dSE =
2800m, respectively. The power budget PE at E is fixed such
that PE |hSD|2/σ2 = 10dB, whereas the transmission power
PS by the suspicious source varies such that the reference SNR
γ0 increases from 0 dB to 20 dB. Fig. 7 shows the maximum
achievable eavesdropping rate by the three considered schemes
versus γ0 under each of the two setups. It is first observed that
for the case of dSE = 400m where E has better channel
than D, the eavesdropping rate with all three considered
schemes increases with PS . However, the proposed spoofing
relaying scheme performs significantly better than the other
two schemes, due to the constructive relaying performed at
E that enhances the effective channel capacity from S to D.
For the case of dSE = 2800m, the eavesdropping rate by
both passive eavesdropping and jamming only is zero due to
the poor channel between S and E. In contrast, the proposed
spoofing relaying technique is able to achieve strictly positive
eavesdropping rate for γ0 below a certain threshold, beyond
which the eavesdropping rate drops to zero since the suspicious
transmission rate cannot be degraded to a value decodable by
E with its given transmit power constraint PE .
Lastly, by assuming equal number transmitting and receiv-
ing antennas at the eavesdropper, i.e., M = N , N¯ , Fig. 8
Fig. 7: Eavesdropping rate versus γ0 , PS |hSD|2/σ2.
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Fig. 8: Eavesdropping rate versus the number of
transmitting/receiving antennas at the eavesdropper.
shows the eavesdropping rate versus N¯ for dSE = 2800m,
γ0 = 10 dB, and PE = PS . Note that since the loop channel
HEE is of rank-1 under the LoS assumption, the ZF constraint
(5) is feasible as long as N ≥ 2. Fig. 8 shows that the
performance of all the three eavesdropping schemes in general
improves with the increasing of N¯ , which is expected due to
the more powerful receiving/transmitting beamforming gains
as more antennas are used. However, for the two benchmark
schemes, no further improvement on the eavesdropping rate
is possible for N¯ beyond 6, since the eavesdropping rate
is fundamentally limited by the source transmission rate,
which neither passive eavesdropping nor jamming is able to
improve when the eavesdropping link becomes better than the
suspicious link. In contrast, thanks to the constructive relaying,
the proposed spoofing relaying technique is able to achieve
continuous eavesdropping rate improvement as N¯ increases,
though with a diminishing gain. This again shows the superior
performance of the proposed eavesdropping strategy over the
two benchmark schemes.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has studied the new wireless information surveil-
lance problem in the general paradigm of wireless security. A
novel proactive eavesdropping scheme with spoofing relaying
technique has been proposed. With the proposed scheme,
the legitimate monitor acts as a full-duplex relay for simul-
taneous eavesdropping and spoofing relaying to render the
suspicious source to vary transmission rate in favor of the
eavesdropping performance. The receive power splitting ratios
and the transmit precoding matrix at the legitimate monitor
are jointly optimized for eavesdropping rate maximization.
Numerical results show that the proposed spoofing relay
technique significantly enhances the information surveillance
performance as compared to the two benchmark schemes with
passive or jamming-based eavesdropping.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To show Theorem 1, we first apply the triangle inequality
to (17), which yields
γ˜D(ρ,W) ≤
(∣∣hSD∣∣+ ∣∣hˆHEDWhˆSE∣∣)2 P˜S
1 + ‖hˆHEDW‖2
, ∀W, (36)
where equality holds if and only if W is chosen such that
the two effective signal paths from S to D add constructively,
i.e., ∠hSD = ∠hˆHEDWhˆSE . Furthermore, since an arbitrary
phase shifting of W does not alter the feasibility of the power
constraint in (19), problem (19) is thus equivalent to
γ˜maxD (ρ) ,
maxW γ˜′D(W) ,
(
|hSD|+
∣∣hˆHEDWhˆSE∣∣)2P˜S
1+‖hˆHEDW‖2
s.t. P˜S‖WhˆSE‖2 + ‖W‖2F ≤ P˜E .
(37)
Lemma 2. The optimal solution to problem (37) is
W? =
√
µ?h˜EDh˜
H
SE , (38)
where µ? is the optimal solution to the following optimization
problem
γ˜maxD (ρ) ,
maxµ γ˜′D(µ) ,
(|hSD|+√µ‖hˆED‖‖hˆSE‖)2P˜S
1+µ‖hˆED‖2
s.t. 0 ≤ µ ≤ P˜E
P˜S‖hˆSE‖2+1 .
(39)
Proof: We show Lemma 2 by construction. Suppose that
an optimal solution to (37) is given by W′ =
√
µ′W˜, with
‖W˜‖F = 1, and the resulting optimal value is γ˜′D(W′). We
then construct an alternative solution W′′ in the form of (38),
i.e., W′′ =
√
µ′′h˜EDh˜HSE , with
µ′′ = µ′
∣∣hˆHEDW˜hˆSE∣∣2
‖hˆED‖2‖hˆSE‖2
≤ µ′, (40)
where the last inequality follows from the sub-multiplicativity
property of the Frobenius norm, i.e., ‖AB‖F ≤ ‖A‖F ‖B‖F
for any conformable matrices (vectors) A and B [29]. We aim
to show that the newly constructed matrix W′′ is feasible to
problem (37), and also returns an objective value no smaller
than γ˜′D(W
′). To this end, we first show the following:
P˜S‖W′′hˆSE‖2 + ‖W′′‖2F = P˜Sµ′
∣∣hˆHEDW˜hˆSE∣∣2
‖hˆED‖2
+ µ′′
(41)
≤ P˜Sµ′‖W˜hˆSE‖2 + µ′ (42)
≤ P˜E , (43)
where (42) follows from µ′′ ≤ µ′ and the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality |aHb|2 ≤ ‖a‖2‖b‖2, ∀a,b; and (43) is true since
W′ =
√
µ′W˜ must satisfy the power constraint of problem
(37). The above result shows that the newly constructed matrix
W′′ also satisfies the power constraint at E, and hence is
feasible to problem (37). Furthermore, the following results
can be obtained,∣∣hˆHEDW′′hˆSE∣∣ = √µ′′‖hˆED‖‖hˆSE‖ = √µ′∣∣hˆHEDW˜hˆSE∣∣
=
∣∣hˆHEDW′hˆSE∣∣, (44)
‖hˆHEDW′′‖ =
√
µ′′‖hˆED‖ =
√
µ′
∣∣hˆHEDW˜hˆSE∣∣
‖hˆSE‖
≤
√
µ′‖hˆHEDW˜‖ = ‖hˆHEDW′‖. (45)
Based on (44) and (45), it is not difficult to conclude that
γ˜′D(W
′′) ≥ γ˜′D(W′). In summary, for any optimal solution
W′ to problem (37), we can always construct a feasible
solution W′′ in the form of (38) that achieves no smaller
objective value; thus, W′′ must also be optimal. Furthermore,
problem (39) is resulted by substituting (38) into (37). This
completes the proof of Lemma 2.
The uni-variate optimization problem (39) can be then
solved by examining its first-order derivative. Together with
Lemma 2, the results in Theorem 1 can be obtained. This
completes the proof of Theorem 1.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
To show Theorem 2, we first apply the triangle inequality
to (17), which yields
γ˜D(ρ,W) ≥
(∣∣hSD∣∣− ∣∣hˆHEDWhˆSE∣∣)2 PS
(1 + ‖hˆHEDW‖2)σ2
, ∀W, (46)
where equality holds if and only if W is chosen such that the
two effective signal paths from S to D add destructively, i.e.,
∠hSD = pi + ∠hˆHEDWhˆSE . Furthermore, since an arbitrary
phase shifting of W does not alter the feasibility of problem
(22), the optimal solution to (22) can be obtained by solving
γ˜minD (ρ) ,
minW γ˜′′D(W) ,
(
|hSD|−
∣∣hˆHEDWhˆSE∣∣)2P˜S
1+‖hˆHEDW‖2
s.t. P˜S‖WhˆSE‖2 + ‖W‖2F ≤ P˜E .
(47)
Next, we derive the optimal structure of the solution to
(47). Recall that W is a matrix of dimension r0×M . Define
an r0-dimensional unitary matrix U ,
[
h˜ED U⊥
]
, where
U⊥ ∈ Cr0×(r0−1) is the orthogonal complement of h˜ED such
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that UHU = Ir0 . Similarly, define an M -dimensional unitary
matrix V ,
[
h˜SE V⊥
]
, where VHV = IM . Then any matrix
W ∈ Cr0×M can be expressed as
W = UQVH =
[
h˜ED U⊥
] [
q11 q
H
12
q21 Q22
] [
h˜HSE
VH⊥
]
, (48)
where q11 ∈ C, q12 ∈ C(M−1)×1, q21 ∈ C(r0−1)×1, and
Q22 ∈ C(r0−1)×(M−1) are the new optimization variables after
unitary transformations by U and V. By substituting W with
(48), we have the following results:∣∣hˆHEDWhˆSE∣∣ = |q11|‖hˆED‖‖hˆSE‖ (49)
‖h˜HEDW‖2 = ‖hˆED‖2
(|q11|2 + ‖q12‖2) (50)
‖WhˆSE‖2 = ‖hˆSE‖2
(|q11|2 + ‖q21‖2) (51)
‖W‖2F = |q11|2 + ‖q21‖2 + ‖q12‖2 + ‖Q22‖2F . (52)
It is observed from (49)-(52) that the objective value of
problem (47) is independent of q21 and Q22. Besides, the
left hand side (LHS) of the power constraint in problem (47)
increases with ‖q21‖2 and ‖Q22‖2F . Thus, without loss of
optimality, we can set q21 = 0 and Q22 = 0. Furthermore,
as both the objective value and the transmit power depend on
q12 via its norm ‖q12‖ only, we can assume without loss of
optimality that q12 =
√
z2 [1 0 · · · 0]T for z2 ≥ 0. Similarly,
we may assume q11 =
√
z1 for z1 ≥ 0 without loss of
optimality. Therefore, it follows from (48) that the optimal
solution to (47) can be expressed as
W = h˜ED
(√
z1h˜SE +
√
z2h˜
⊥
SE
)H
. (53)
By substituting (53) into problem (47), we obtain the opti-
mization problem (24) for determining the optimal weighting
coefficients z1 and z2.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Note that the objective value of problem (24) is al-
ways non-negative, and it equals to zero if z1 =
|hSD|2/
(‖hˆED‖2‖hˆSE‖2) , z′1. Thus, if z′1 is achievable,
i.e., z′1 ≤ P˜E/(1 + P˜S‖hˆSE‖2), the pair (z′1, 0) is obviously
the optimal solution to (24). This corresponds to the first
case of (25). For the remaining cases, it can be verified that
at the optimal solution, the power constraint of (24) should
be satisfied with equality, since otherwise, one can always
increase z2 to further minimize the objective value. Therefore,
the variable z2 can be eliminated by substituting with z1,
and the problem reduces an uni-variate optimization problem,
which can be solved by examining its first-order derivative.
The details are omitted for brevity.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The key for proving Theorem 4 is to use the fact that
all the three functions γ˜E(ρ), γ˜maxD (ρ), and γ˜
min
D (ρ) depend
on ρ only via the term ‖hˆSE(ρ)‖2 = hHSEdiag(ρ)hSE =∑M
m=1 ρm|hSE,m|2, where hSE,m denotes the mth element
of hSE . Assume that (ρ′, γ˜′D) is an optimal solution to (P3),
with the mth element of ρ′ given by 0 ≤ ρ′m ≤ 1, m =
1, · · · ,M . We construct a new power splitting vector ρ′′ =
ρ′′1, with ρ′′ =
(∑M
m=1 ρ
′
m|hSE,m|2
)
/
(∑M
m=1 |hSE,m|2
)
.
It is obvious that 0 ≤ ρ′′ ≤ 1, and thus the constraint
0  ρ′′  1 is satisfied. Furthermore, we also have
‖hˆSE(ρ′′)‖2 = ‖hˆSE(ρ′)‖2, and hence γ˜E(ρ′′) = γ˜E(ρ′),
γ˜maxD (ρ
′′) = γ˜maxD (ρ
′), and γ˜minD (ρ
′′) = γ˜minD (ρ
′). Therefore,
the pair (ρ′′, γ˜′D) is also an optimal solution to (P3). This
completes the proof of Theorem 4.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
The proof of Theorem 5 is similar to that of Theorem 4,
which exploits the fact that the power splitting vector ρ affects
the SNRs at both D and E only via the term ‖hˆSE(ρ)‖2 =∑M
m=1 ρm|hSE,m|2. Let ρ?ups = ρ?ups1 be the optimal UPS
vector to problem (P3). If ρ?ups = 0 or ρ
?
ups = 1, then
Theorem 5 is already satisfied. Thus, we assume 0 < ρ?ups < 1.
In this case, it can be verified that there always exists an integer
m′ ∈ {1, · · · ,M} such that both the following inequalities
hold,
m′−1∑
m=1
∣∣hSE,[m]∣∣2 < ρ?ups M∑
m=1
∣∣hSE,m∣∣2, (54)
m′∑
m=1
∣∣hSE,[m]∣∣2 ≥ ρ?ups M∑
m=1
∣∣hSE,m∣∣2, (55)
where [·] is the permutation operation such that |hSE,[1]|2 ≥
· · · ≥ |hSE,[M ]|2. As a result, we define a new power splitting
vector ρbps with binary power splitting (BPS) over M − 1
receiving antennas such that
ρbps,m =

1, m = [1], · · · , [m′ − 1],
ρbps, m = [m
′],
0, m = [m′ + 1], · · · , [M ],
(56)
where
ρbps =
ρ?ups
∑M
m=1 |hSE,m|2 −
∑m′−1
m=1 |hSE,[m]|2
|hSE,[m′]|2 . (57)
It can be verified that 0 < ρbps ≤ 1, and hence 0 
ρbps  1 is satisfied. Furthermore, we have ‖hˆSE(ρbps)‖2 =
‖hˆSE(ρups?)‖2. Thus, ρbps must also be an optimal solution
to problem (P3). This completes the proof of Theorem 5.
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